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A DEFENDANT’S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AND DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY IN CONTEMPT CASES 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
People v. Sweat1 
(decided Oct. 28, 2014) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Our Constitution provides that certain individual rights must 
be preserved and protected.2  One of those rights is provided in the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which states that 
no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb.”3  Specifically, when a defendant has been 
convicted or acquitted of a crime, the double jeopardy clause prohib-
its charging the defendant again for the same offense––it would be a 
violation of his constitutional rights.4  Moreover, double jeopardy 
bars multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.5 
In People v. Sweat, the New York Court of Appeals consid-
ered the issue of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the de-
fendant’s contempt charge.6  The People had appealed this case be-
cause both the Buffalo City Court and Buffalo County Court held that 
the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the defendant’s contempt charge 
on the grounds that the previous contempt proceeding was criminal in 
nature and stemmed from the same offense.7 
 
1 People v. Sweat, 23 N.E.3d 955 (N.Y. 2014). 
2 U.S.  CONST. amend. V. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. See U.S.  CONST. amend. IV; see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) 
(holding that the “Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
5 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (“The Clause protects only against the 
imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.”) (quoting Helvering v. 
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)). 
6 Sweat, 23 N.E.3d at 957. 
7 Id.  
1
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The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Buffalo County 
Court’s decision and reasoned that the Double Jeopardy Clause did 
not bar the defendant’s subsequent contempt prosecution because the 
defendant’s prior contempt charge was “remedial” only for the pur-
pose of coercing the defendant to testify.8  In reaching its holding, the 
court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Shil-
litani v. United States,9 where it provided a test to resolve the correct 
contempt determination for the purposes of double jeopardy.10 
Under Shillitani, the governing question was “what does the 
court primarily seek to accomplish by imposing this sentence?”11  
Many courts, including the New York Court of Appeals in Sweat, 
have relied on Shillitani to assess the proper contempt determination 
of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent contempt 
charge.12  While Shillitani has provided the courts with guidance to 
resolve the proper contempt determination in analyzing the underly-
ing purpose for which the contempt charges were brought, this test is 
still too broad. 
This Note proposes a more clearly defined Shillitani test be-
cause, although it is applied consistently in courts across the country, 
it yields inconsistent results.13  Thus, if the United States Supreme 
Court were to revisit Shillitani, it should provide more guidance to 
the lower courts to distinguish between remedial and punitive con-
tempt sentences to prevent a violation of a defendant’s Constitutional 
rights. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On February 23, 2012, the defendant, Tyrone Sweat, was un-
willing to testify at his brother’s trial in Erie County Supreme 
Court.14 The prosecution granted the defendant transactional immuni-
ty so he was unable to waive his right to testify at his brother’s trial.15  
When the defendant continually refused to testify, the court warned 
 
8 Id. at 957, 964-65. 
9 384 U.S. 364 (1966). 
10 Sweat, 23 N.E.3d at 962. 
11 Id. at 959-60. 
12 Id. 
13 See infra Section VII. for a discussion of Shillitani. 
14 Sweat, 23 N.E.3d at 957. 
15 Id. 
2
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the defendant about the possibility of being held in contempt.16  The 
People expressed, “[w]e’ll ask that [defendant] be cited for civil con-
tempt and confined until he agrees to testify or until the end of the 
proceeding, and also we’ll charge him with criminal contempt for re-
fusing to be sworn and testify.”17  Accordingly, the defendant was 
cited for contempt for failure to testify and placed in custody.18 
After being placed in custody and assigned an attorney, the 
defendant continued to refuse to testify.19  The court repeatedly re-
quested that he do so, and made clear that if he did not, he would be 
obstructing the proceedings and contempt charges would be im-
posed.20  When the defendant did not change his mind, the court is-
sued a “mandated commitment.”21  The defendant was also told that 
he would remain in confinement until the proceedings were complet-
ed, and that criminal charges would be filed as well.22  Subsequently, 
the defendant’s brother’s trial resulted in an acquittal and the defend-
ant was released from custody.23 
However, soon after the defendant’s release, he was charged 
with two counts of criminal contempt in the second degree for failing 
to testify at his brother’s trial.24  The defendant filed a motion to dis-
miss the charges on double jeopardy grounds and the city court 
granted the motion and dismissed the charges.25 
The Buffalo City Court found that the county court previously 
held the defendant in criminal contempt.26  Thus, it concluded that 
because the contempt adjudication at trial and the charges subse-
quently filed under the New York Penal Law Section 215.50 were 
based on identical conduct, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the 
 
16 Sweat, 23 N.E.3d at 957. 
17 Id. at 957-58. 
18 Id. at 958. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Sweat, 23 N.E.3d at 958.  See also N.Y. JUD. § 752 (defining “mandated commitment” 
as “[w]here a person is committed for contempt, as prescribed in section seven hundred fifty-
one [up to $1,000 fine and/or up to 30 days in jail], particular circumstances of his offense 
must be set forth in the mandate of commitment. Such mandate, punishing a person summar-
ily for a contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, is reviewable 
by a proceeding under article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules.”). 
22 Sweat, 23 N.E.3d at 958.  
23 Id. 
24 Id.; see also N.Y.  PENAL LAW § 215.50 (McKinney 2016). 
25 Sweat, 23 N.E.3d at 958.  
26 Id. at 958-59. 
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charges.27  The Erie County Supreme Court, the intermediate appel-
late level court at the time, affirmed the Buffalo City Court’s deci-
sion.28  Although the county court reasoned that the contempt pro-
ceedings were a “hybrid combination of both criminal and civil 
characteristics,” it found them to be primarily criminal because the 
defendant was confined and the actions of the court were in accord 
with the criminal contempt provisions of the Judiciary Law Section 
750.29  The People appealed this decision and the New York Court of 
Appeals granted leave to appeal.30 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
The issue on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was 
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the defendant, Sweat’s, 
subsequent contempt prosecution.31  Sweat alleged that because he 
had already been held in criminal contempt of court and punished ac-
cordingly, double jeopardy prevented him from being charged again 
for the same offense under New York Penal Law Section 215.50.32  
Conversely, the People argued that because Sweat was only condi-
tionally imprisoned, and not prosecuted or tried for the crime, double 
jeopardy would not bar a subsequent contempt charge against him.33 
The New York Court of Appeals accepted the People’s argu-
ment.34  It reversed the Erie County Supreme Court’s ruling and con-
cluded that double jeopardy did not bar the defendant’s subsequent 
contempt prosecution.35  In resolving the issue, the New York Court 
of Appeals first determined the county court’s purpose for holding 
Sweat in contempt of court.36  In doing so, the New York Court of 
Appeals analyzed the prior contempt charge in order to cross-
reference it with the subsequent contempt charge brought against 
Sweat.37  If the subsequent prosecution charge was of the “same 
 
27 Id. at 959. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Sweat, 23 N.E.3d at 959.  
31 Id. at 957. 
32 Id. at 959. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Sweat, 23 N.E.3d at 965.  
36 Id. at 964. 
37 Id. 
4
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character and purpose” as the first, double jeopardy would bar it.38  
Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that because 
the defendant’s prior punishment was “conditional imprisonment,” 
and only remedial to coerce the defendant to testify at his brother’s 
trial, a subsequent criminal contempt charge was not barred.39 
IV. THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
The Fifth Amendment, which provides that no person shall 
“be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb,” has been rooted in our history since the Bill of Rights was 
added to the United States Constitution in 1791.40  Since that time, 
the Fifth Amendment has been one of our basic fundamental rights 
and it safeguards against double jeopardy to prevent an individual 
from being put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.41  However, 
despite this provision, there is still ambiguity within the courts in de-
termining when double jeopardy should apply to ensure a proper 
double jeopardy analysis is carried out.42  While this area of the law 
is still inconclusive, there are two major federal court decisions, 
Blockburger v. United States43 and Shillitani v. United States,44 that 
have provided the standards for a double jeopardy analysis. 
Blockburger provided one of the first tests to guide courts in 
preventing double jeopardy.45  In Blockburger v. United States, the 
defendant was charged with three counts in violation of the Harrison 
Narcotics Act for selling drugs not in their original packaging and 
without a written order.46  The petitioner argued that because the two 
charges were made to the same person during a specific time period, 
it constituted a single, not multiple, offenses.47 
 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 965. 
40 See U.S.  CONST. amend. V; see also David S. Rudstein, A Brief History of the Fifth 
Amendment Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 193, 242 
(2005). 
41 See Rudstein, supra note 40. 
42 Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment: Cutting the Gordian 
Knot, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 595, 619 (2006). 
43 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
44 Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 364. 
45 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 
46 Id. at 300-01. 
47 Id. at 301-02. 
5
Khan: Double Jeopardy in Contempt Cases
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
838 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court.48  
The Court held that although the two drug sales were made to the 
same person, the elements of each drug sale were different.49  There-
fore, the two sales constituted two separate offenses under the law.50  
As a result, under Blockburger, the government was permitted to sep-
arately try and punish the defendant for two crimes as long as the el-
ements of each crime were different.51   
The Court strictly applied the test to determine if the defend-
ant’s offenses related to one another or contained different elements 
in each offense.52  Although the defendant argued that because he 
sold the drugs during a continuous time period, he could only be pe-
nalized once under the law and not charged with multiple punish-
ments for the same offense, the Court held otherwise.53  The Court 
reasoned that the defendant could be punished separately for the two 
offenses because he violated two sections of the law: Section 1 of the 
Narcotics Act for selling drugs not in their original stamped package, 
and Section 2 of the Narcotics Act for selling the drugs without a 
written order.54  Since these were two different statutory sections, 
where each crime contained an element the other did not, the defend-
ant could be prosecuted for both under the Narcotics Act section 
without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.55  Thus, under Block-
burger, only if the act relates to the “same offense,” does double 
jeopardy bar additional punishment and successive prosecution.56  
The decision and resulting test in this case gave courts the guidance 
needed to analyze double jeopardy. 
Shillitani v. United States57 is another landmark case that 
made a distinction between two types of contempt sentences: “civil” 
and “criminal” contempt to determine the correct contempt determi-
 
48 Id. at 299. 
49 Id. at 303-04. 
50 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 
51 Id. See also People v. Bryant, 699 N.E.2d 910, 913 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that “[the 
charges are not barred by Double Jeopardy where] each of the Federal crimes committed by 
defendants contained an element that is not an element of any of the State crimes for which 
defendants were prosecuted.”) 
52 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 
53 Id. at 301-02. 
54 Id. at 303-05. 
55 Id. at 304. 
56 Id. at 304. 
57 384 U.S. at 365-72 (1966). 
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nation for the purposes of double jeopardy.58  The petitioner was a 
prosecution witness at a grand jury proceeding and at issue were po-
tential violations of the Narcotic Control Act of 1956.59  When the 
petitioner was asked to respond to certain questions, he invoked his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.60  The district 
court granted him immunity, but he continued to refuse to answer the 
questions.61  Consequently, he was charged with contempt and sen-
tenced to two years in prison, with an early release should he choose 
to answer the questions.62 
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, arguing that he had a constitutional right to a trial 
by jury for the criminal contempt sentence imposed.63  However, the 
government argued that the defendant was not entitled to a trial by ju-
ry because his release was contingent on his willingness to testify.64  
The court agreed with the government and affirmed the defendant’s 
sentence, noting that the defendant had the “right to be released if and 
when he obeyed the order to testify.”65  The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the appropriate sen-
tence had been imposed upon the defendant.66  The Court affirmed 
the Second Circuit’s decision, which marked a turning point in dis-
tinguishing between “civil” and “criminal” contempt.67 
The Court emphasized that rather than characterizing the type 
of contempt, the governing test was “what does the court primarily 
seek to accomplish by imposing [this] sentence?”68  Here, the primary 
purpose of the Court in imposing this sentence was to coerce the de-
fendant to testify before the grand jury.69  Furthermore, the Court 
held that, although the petitioner’s conduct was referenced as “crimi-
nal contempt,” it was more “civil” in nature because the petitioner 
himself could avoid confinement if he obeyed the court order and tes-
 
58 Id. at 368. 
59 Id. at 365. 
60 Id. at 365-66. 
61 Id. at 366. 
62 Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 366. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 366-67. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 365. 
67 Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 369. 
68 Id. at 370. 
69 Id. 
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tified.70  This determination was further evidenced by the district 
court judge, who at the time of sentencing said to the defendant, “I 
want to make it clear that the sentence of the [c]ourt is not intended 
so much by the way of punishment as it is intended solely to secure 
for the grand jury answers to the questions that have been asked of 
you.”71  Therefore, this case set a precedent that even though the 
court may characterize a sentence a certain way, the most important 
factor is the “character and purpose” of the court in what it seeks to 
accomplish when it imposes the sentence.72 
In sum, the federal courts are subject to the Blockburger and 
the Shillitani tests, which serve to protect the defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment right under the Double Jeopardy Clause to ensure justice 
is preserved and a defendant’s constitutional rights are not violated.  
The Blockburger test provides the necessary guidance in correctly 
analyzing a double jeopardy claim.73  Specifically, in a double jeop-
ardy analysis, if the act relates to the same offense, double jeopardy 
will automatically bar additional punishment by successive prosecu-
tion.74  Similarly, the Shillitani test assesses the nature of the two 
charges to prevent double jeopardy, and in the event the charges are 
the same, the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar the successive pros-
ecution by determining the “character and purpose” of the sentence.75 
V. CONTEMPT CASES AND PRECLUSION OF A SECOND TRIAL TO 
COMPLY WITH DOUBLE JEOPARDY UNDER STATE LAW 
As is the case with the Federal Constitution, the New York 
State Constitution guarantees that when a defendant has committed a 
crime, he may not be charged twice for the same offense under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.76  This is codified in the New York Crimi-
nal Procedure Law Section 40.20, which provides that a person may 
not be twice prosecuted for the same offense based upon the same act 
 
70 Id. at 368-70. 
71 Id. at 368. 
72 Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 368.  See also Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 
418, 441 (1911) (“It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and purpose, that 
often serve to distinguish civil from criminal contempt.”). 
73 Poulin, supra note 42, at 602. 
74 Id. 
75 Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 369. 
76 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense.”) 
8
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or criminal transaction.77  It also specifies the criteria in determining 
whether a second prosecution is barred due to the nature of the first 
offense.78 
A. New York State Contempt Statutes 
The New York Judiciary Law article 19 and the New York 
Penal Law Section 215.50 are similar because both laws are able to 
hold a defendant for contempt.79  However, they differ in the manner 
in which each enforces a contempt sentence and the distinctly sepa-
rate purposes of the court in imposing one over the other.80 
Under Article 19 of the Judiciary Law, the court may hold a 
defendant accountable for either civil or criminal contempt and will 
determine under which part of the Act to punish the defendant based 
on his conduct.81  Specifically, Section 750 of the Judiciary Law pro-
vides that a person is guilty of criminal contempt if he resisted or dis-
obeyed a lawful mandate by the court or disrupted court proceedings 
by “disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior . . . in [the 
court’s] immediate view and presence.”82  The court’s punishment for 
criminal contempt is imprisonment and/or a fine and there is no op-
portunity for the defendant to redeem himself because the court’s 
punishment is final.83  Under this section, the judge must issue an or-
der “stating the facts which constitute the offense and which bring the 
case within the provisions of this section, and plainly and specifically 
prescribing the punishment to be inflicted thereof.”84 
Conversely, Section 753 of the Judiciary Law provides that 
 
77 N.Y. CRIM.  PROC. § 40.20 (McKinney 2016). 
78 Id.  As codified in the New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 40.20: 
A person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon 
the same act or criminal transaction unless: (a) The offenses as defined 
have substantially different elements and the acts establishing one of-
fense are in the main clearly distinguishable from those establishing the 
other; or (b) Each of the offenses as defined contains an element which 
is not an element of the other, and the statutory provisions defining such 
offenses are designed to prevent very different kinds of harms or evil. 
Id. 
79 Lawrence N. Gray, Criminal and Civil Contempt: Some Sense of a Hodgepodge, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 337, 355 (1998). 
80 Id. 
81 N.Y. JUD. art. 19 (McKinney 2003) (containing contempt laws). 
82 N.Y. JUD. § 750 (McKinney 2016). 
83 Id. at § 751. 
84 Id. at § 755. 
9
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when a defendant is guilty of civil contempt, such contempt benefits 
the plaintiff in the action because it provides compensation or forces 
testimonial coercion.85  It forces a reluctant defendant to comply with 
a court order.86  It is considered “remedial” and not a punishment by 
the court because, when the defendant is imprisoned for non-
compliance with a court’s order, the defendant can still be released 
upon complying with the mandate of the court.87  The courts often re-
fer to this as “conditional contempt” because the defendant is only 
temporarily imprisoned until he adheres to the requested mandate, or 
he may pay a fine to be released for failing to comply with the court 
order.88 
In New York, criminal contempt can also be punished under 
the New York Penal Law Section 215.50.89  A defendant can be 
charged for disobedience to the court or court proceedings, specifical-
ly for “[d]isorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior, committed 
during the sitting of a court”;90 “[i]ntentional disobedience or re-
sistance to the lawful process or other mandate of a court”;91 or 
“[c]ontumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness in any 
court proceeding or, after being sworn, to answer any legal and prop-
er interrogatory.”92 
This section of the New York Penal Law is similar to the lan-
guage of the Judiciary Law.93  However, under the New York Penal 
Law, when a defendant is charged under this section, he is not able to 
remedy the situation by complying with the court order or mandate, 
whereas under the Judiciary Law he can.94 
VI. THE NEW YORK STATE APPROACH 
The New York State Constitution provides that “No person 
shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense” and 
New York State courts have adhered to the Blockburger test that fed-
 
85 Id. at § 753. 
86 Id. 
87 N.Y. JUD. § 753 (McKinney 2016). 
88 Gray, supra note 79, at 343. 




93 Gray, supra note 79, at 339. 
94 Id. at 343. 
10
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eral courts apply to prevent double jeopardy in contempt cases.95  In 
People v. Wood,96 the New York Court of Appeals held that a de-
fendant could not be charged with contempt on two different orders 
of protection that related to one offense.97  The defendant’s ex-wife 
obtained two orders of protection against the defendant and filed one 
in Monroe County Family Court and another in Rochester City 
Court.98  The orders of protection stated that the defendant was to 
have “no contact whatsoever” with his ex-wife.99  However, the de-
fendant prank-called his former wife eleven times.100  When the calls 
were traced to the defendant’s home, his former wife commenced a 
contempt proceeding against the defendant in Family Court due to his 
failure to comply with the order of protection that was filed against 
him.101 
The defendant was found guilty in Family Court for violating 
the order of protection and was sentenced to six months imprison-
ment.102  Subsequently, the defendant was also charged with criminal 
contempt and harassment.103  The charges were based on the defend-
ant’s violation of the order of protection filed with the Rochester City 
Court and stemmed from his previous conduct of prank-calling his 
former wife.104 
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge in Monroe 
County Supreme Court based on a double jeopardy claim, but the 
motion was dismissed because the court held that “the Family Court 
contempt proceeding was based upon the violation of a different or-
der of protection than that which served as a basis for the criminal 
contempt charge.”105  The defendant was found guilty of all five 
counts of criminal contempt and harassment.106  However, the Appel-
late Division for the Fourth Department reversed the defendant’s 
 
95 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.  See also supra Section II. for a discussion of the Blockburger 
test. 
96 742 N.E.2d 114 (N.Y. 2000). 
97 Id. at 114. 
98 Id. at 115. 
99 Id. at 115-16. 
100 Id. at 116. 





106 Wood, 742 N.E.2d at 116. 
11
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conviction on all counts because the court held that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred the criminal prosecution 
because both court orders of protection were violated by the defend-
ant’s conduct of prank-calling.107  Therefore, because the violations 
of the two different orders of protection were based on the same con-
duct, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the criminal prosecution.108 
The People appealed the decision and the New York Court of 
Appeals granted leave to appeal.109  The New York Court of Appeals 
affirmed the decision and in its reasoning addressed the difficulty of 
concurrent jurisdiction between family courts and criminal courts 
when individuals seek relief by way of an order of protection against 
a family member for certain criminal acts.110  The court determined 
that since each court is able to issue an order of protection, double 
jeopardy issues might present themselves, as in the case here.111  But 
the New York Court of Appeals took a resolute stance and applied 
the Blockburger test.112 
In its application, the court held that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause should have barred the defendant’s subsequent charge.113  Be-
cause the conduct was one event that violated two different statutory 
provisions, the court had to determine whether each provision con-
tained “an additional fact which the other [did] not.”114  If each of the 
offenses included an element, which the other did not, they were sep-
arate offenses and not barred for double jeopardy purposes.115  In ap-
plying the Blockburger test to the facts of this case, the court held 
that since the same act violated both orders of protection and each 
statutory provision did not contain an additional element which the 






111 Wood, 742 N.E.2d at 116. 
112 Id. at 117-18. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 117. See supra note 44 (“[W]here the same act or transaction constituted a viola-
tion of two distinct statutory provisions” and if there are two offenses, if each of the offenses 
contain an element which the other does not, they are not the ‘same offense’ and double 
jeopardy would not apply). See also McGovern v. United States, 280 F. 73, 76 (7th Cir. 
1922) (holding a second order void on double jeopardy grounds due to “double prosecution 
of the same offense, or the imposition of double punishment for one offending against the 
order thus twice pronounced.”). 
12
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fendant’s subsequent prosecution.116  Furthermore, under Block-
burger, successive prosecutions that are based on the same conduct 
are barred by double jeopardy; a lesser-included offense is treated the 
“same” as a greater offense.117  Therefore, when the defendant was 
charged under the Family Court contempt provision, a lesser-
included offense than that of criminal contempt in the first degree 
under the New York Penal Law Section 215.51(c), the subsequent of-
fense should have been barred since both orders of protection “had 
one and the same purpose.”118 
The New York Court of Appeals has also applied the Shil-
litani test used in federal courts to bar a subsequent contempt charge 
for the same offense under the New York Penal Law where the evi-
dence showed that the defendant was charged with a previous con-
tempt prosecution that was also criminal in nature.119  In People v. 
Colombo,120 the petitioner refused to answer questions before a grand 
jury in defiance of a court order to do so.121  The Kings County Su-
preme Court held the defendant in criminal contempt under Section 
750 of the Judiciary Law, the governing law for contempt of court, 
and sentenced him to thirty days in prison and ordered him to pay a 
two hundred and fifty dollar fine.122  In other words, by confining the 
defendant, the court was not coercing the defendant to testify, but ra-
ther punishing him for his conduct.123  Subsequently, the petitioner 
was indicted for the same offense under the New York Penal Law 
Section 600.124  The Kings County Supreme Court dismissed the in-
dictment.125  However, the New York Appellate Division for the Sec-
ond Department reversed and held that the indictment was warranted 
due to the defendant’s failure to testify at the grand jury proceed-
ing.126  The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.127 
The New York Court of Appeals held that the Fourteenth 
 
116 Wood, 742 N.E.2d at 118. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. See also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166–68 (1977). 
119 People v. Colombo, 293 N.E.2d 247, 247-48 (N.Y. 1972). 
120 Id. 





126 Colombo, 254 N.E.2d at 340. 
127 Id. 
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Amendment and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment did not bar the indictment because the petitioner had committed 
two acts of contempt on two different occasions of the trial court pro-
ceedings.128  Furthermore, the court held that because the defendant 
was previously confined for contempt under Section 750 of the Judi-
ciary Law, the proceeding was civil in nature, not part of a criminal 
prosecution, and double jeopardy did not apply.129 
The defendant appealed the decision to the United States Su-
preme Court.130  The Court needed to resolve the issue of whether the 
two contempt charges were the same.131  If indeed the two charges 
were the same, the defendant could not be indicted for the second 
charge.132  The Court considered the definite sentence and fine im-
posed upon the defendant to determine if he had previously been sen-
tenced for criminal contempt.133 
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court remanded the 
case to the New York Court of Appeals.134  On remand, the New 
York Court of Appeals followed the United States Supreme Court’s 
recommendation, and in accord with Shillitani, held that since the na-
ture of the offenses was the same, as he was punished under the crim-
inal provisions of both the Judiciary Law and Penal Law for criminal 
contempt, he could not be indicted again because it would be offen-
sive to the Double Jeopardy Clause.135  This decision established a 
precedent that the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar a subsequent 
charge for contempt for the same offense under Section 600 of the 
Penal Law following punishment under Section 750 of the Judiciary 
Law.136 
In conclusion, New York State courts apply the federally rec-
ognized Blockburger test to determine whether a defendant’s rights 
under the New York State Constitution have been violated so as to 
preclude a second contempt trial and remain in compliance with the 




130 Colombo v. New York, 405 U.S. 9 (1972). 
131 Id. at 10. 
132 Id. at 10-11. 
133 Id. at 11. 
134 Id. 
135 Colombo, N.E.2d at 247-48. 
136 Id. 
137 Wood, 742 N.E.2d at 117. 
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law, as well as Shillitani, an individual may be held in contempt un-
der either Section 750 of the New York Judiciary Law or the New 
York Penal Law, but not under both, as per Colombo.138 
VII. ANALYSIS 
In People v. Sweat, the Erie County Supreme Court exercised 
its authority under the criminal provisions of Judiciary Law Section 
750 to hold the defendant in criminal contempt when he obstructed 
the proceedings by his failure to testify.139  Further, in accord with 
Judiciary Law Section 750, the court issued a mandated commitment 
and sent him to confinement.140  The court also advised that it 
“[m]ight be a good idea to give [defendant] a lawyer if you’re going 
to charge him with a criminal charge” and the People agreed.141  This 
is sufficient evidence that the defendant was adjudicated under crimi-
nal contempt proceedings, thus barring any subsequent charge under 
New York Penal Law Section 215.50.142 
The Buffalo City Court and the Erie County Court were cor-
rect in referencing Colombo v. People, because just as the defendant 
in Colombo was cited for criminal contempt and held in confinement, 
so was the defendant here.143  In both cases, the lower courts held that 
the subsequent charge was barred for double jeopardy purposes.144  
However, the New York Court of Appeals held that double jeopardy 
did not bar the subsequent prosecution for criminal contempt under 
New York Penal Law Section 215.50 because the defendant’s first 
charge was “remedial” rather than punitive.145  The court failed to 
take into account that the trial court judge imposed an actual con-
tempt mandate.146  Therefore, to say that the defendant was subject to 
“conditional contempt” was contrary to what was cited in the record 
or indicated by the actions of the court.147 
Furthermore, the fact that the court repeatedly asked the de-
 
138 Colombo, 293 N.E.2d at 247-48. 
139 Sweat, 23 N.E.3d at 957-58. 
140 Id. at 958-59. 
141 Id. at 958. 
142 Id. at 958-59 
143 Id. at 962-63. 
144 Sweat, 23 N.E.3d at 958-64. 
145 Id. at 959. 
146 Id. 958-59. 
147 Id. 
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fendant if he had changed his mind and was willing to testify was of 
no consequence to the People’s argument since the defendant made it 
clear that he was morally opposed to testifying against his brother.148  
The court was not giving the defendant an opportunity to be released 
by complying with the order when the defendant could not avail him-
self of the opportunity presented.149  Therefore, the original contempt 
charge was punitive, and when the prosecution brought a subsequent 
charge against the defendant for the same offense under the New 
York Penal Law, the Double Jeopardy Clause should have barred 
it.150 
However, the difficulty before the New York Court of Ap-
peals was determining the proper characterization of the contempt 
charge to make a correct ruling for double jeopardy purposes.151  The 
New York Court of Appeals misjudged the “character and purpose” 
of the lower court for confining the defendant.152  In Colombo, the 
court sought to punish the defendant for his consistent reluctance to 
testify.153  Since the lower state courts and the New York Court of 
Appeals in Sweat and Colombo both applied the Shillitani test yet 
ruled inconsistently based on the same set of facts, the Shillitani test 
should be more clearly defined to provide courts with a better under-
standing of its proper application.  Specifically, the Shillitani test 
should narrow its purpose, similar to the New York Criminal Proce-
dure Law Section 40.20, to provide a more clearly outlined principle 
that the federal and New York State courts can practically apply.  
Thus, should the United States Supreme Court revisit the Shillitani 
test, the Court should outline the distinction between remedial and 
punitive contempt sentences so that lower courts are aware of the no-
table differences and can uniformly apply the test correctly to reach 
consistent results. 
As it stands now, the test is too broad and leads to incon-
sistent decisions by courts.  Specifically, the Shillitani test should not 
simply ask, “what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by im-
posing this sentence?” but, like the New York Criminal Procedure 
Law Section 40.20, it should provide a context where, under certain 
 
148 Id. 
149 Sweat, 23 N.E.3d at 957-59. 
150 Id. at 958-59. 
151 Id. at 959. 
152 Id. at 964. 
153 Colombo, 293 N.E.2d at 247. 
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circumstances, a defendant’s charge would be considered either re-
medial or punitive for purposes of contempt sentences to correctly 
apply a double jeopardy analysis.  The result will ensure uniformity 
in its application, so that a defendant’s rights are protected against the 
harms of double jeopardy. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
A court’s power to impose contempt sanctions when neces-
sary preserves the order of the court and protects the rights of indi-
viduals.154  However, these sanctions may also be arbitrarily enforced 
when it is within the court’s discretion to determine if an individual’s 
previous contempt charge was remedial or punitive, which would 
then either bar or not bar a subsequent prosecution for contempt on 
double jeopardy grounds.155  When a defendant’s Fifth Amendment 
right is violated on double jeopardy grounds, a flaw exists in our sys-
tem. 
  A newly developed bright-line test will ensure that the test is 
not only applied consistently, but results in consistent holdings by 
courts to ensure justice and fairness for all accused.  Since the Fifth 
Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause is one of our most basic and 
fundamental rights, it is critical to make a correct contempt determi-
nation in successive prosecutions to determine whether or not there 
would be a double jeopardy bar.  Therefore, the test must not be 
overbroad because “there are no ‘equities’ to be balanced, for the 
Clause has declared a constitutional policy, based on grounds which 
are not open to judicial examination.”156  By reworking the Shillitani 
test to provide more guidance to the lower courts to distinguish be-
tween remedial and punitive contempt sentences, the courts can carry 
out a proper double jeopardy analysis and reach consistent holdings 
to protect the Fifth Amendment right of all accused.  
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